ABSTRACT: Despite the fact that several event studies have investigated the market's reaction to information technology (IT) investment announcements, little is known about how specific transactional risks influence the market value of a firm. This study examines stock market data to assess investors' responses to various transactional risks associated with IT outsourcing. More specifically, we develop and test several hypotheses to understand how transactional risks that arise due to a range of factors (i.e., the size of outsourcing contracts, difficulties in performance monitoring, asset specificity of IT resources, vendor capability, and the lack of cultural similarity between client
IN RECENT YEARS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) outsourcing has become widespread despite the ongoing debate over its impact on business performance [23] . Potential benefits from IT outsourcing include reduced costs, improved system quality, the ability to focus on core competencies, and access to new technologies. These benefits have been well documented conceptually [42] and are also supported by several empirical studies [16, 43, 50, 67] . Nonetheless, issues pertaining to the potential hazards of IT outsourcing have remained a primary focus of attention, spawning several studies exploring the risks of IT outsourcing [5, 6, 19] . Prior literature suggests that IT outsourcing bears inherent risks to the client firm, including vendor opportunism and a loss of control due to the asset specificity of the outsourced resources [52] , technological lock-in [6] , and other transactional risks arising from contractual hurdles. Although many attempts have been made to articulate various risks that result from IT outsourcing, most studies of outsourcing risk have been either descriptive or prescriptive in nature and provide only conjectures or anecdotal evidence for the presumed risks. Because much of the value of IT itself is intangible, hidden, and long-term oriented, an empirical validation and assessment of such risks has not been feasible. In this study, we seek to fill this gap by using an event study methodology, which empirically assesses how investors perceive and evaluate the benefits and risks of IT outsourcing.
Recently, the event study method has emerged as a pervasive mechanism by which to explore the relationship between IT investments and business performance because of its ability to measure investors' perceptions of the intangible costs and benefits associated with IT investments [13, 17, 18, 31] . In our study, we examine the market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements in order to assess transactional risks that arise due to a range of factors, such as the size of outsourcing contracts, difficulties in performance monitoring, asset specificity, cultural dissimilarity, and vendor capability. Building on prior work in business strategy and economics, the specific questions that we seek to answer include: Does the size of outsourcing contracts affect the market's perception of IT outsourcing announcements? To what ex-tent does the asset specificity of the resources and activities to be outsourced influence the market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements? Does the market react more favorably when the client and IT service provider are culturally similar, in terms of industry group membership? To what extent does a vendor's resource availability and capability influence investors' perception of the transactional risks associated with outsourcing? Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives, including transaction cost economics (TCE), resource dependency theory, and agency theory, we seek to provide answers to these questions.
This study makes several contributions to our understanding of various transactional risks related to IT outsourcing. Despite the fact that several event studies have investigated the market's reaction to IT investment announcements [13, 17, 18, 31, 56] and other IT-related issues [14, 69] , little is known about the extent to which specific transactional risks influence investors' reactions with regard to the business value of IT outsourcing. Based on our review of several theoretical domains from the economics and strategy literatures, we identify five types of transactional risks and then empirically assess their effects on the perceived value of IT outsourcing using standard event study methods. A key difference between our study and prior empirical studies of IT outsourcing is that we anticipate and probe the reasons for negative market reactions to many IT outsourcing announcements. In contrast, prior event studies of IT outsourcing have largely assumed a positive market reaction to such announcements and have developed their hypotheses accordingly (e.g., [28, 51, 58] ). As a result, the other side of story-the potentially negative market response-has received little attention, and any such declines in client firms' stock prices are assumed to be aberrations or outliers. Our study seeks to fill this gap by providing a theoretical rationale for why negative reactions to IT outsourcing may sometimes occur.
Literature Review IT Outsourcing Literature LARGE-SCALE IT OUTSOURCING is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to the late 1980s [4, 50] , although the controversy over the "make-or-buy" decision or "markets versus hierarchies" has persisted in both the economics and strategy literature for decades [27, 54] . Because the primary question of IT outsourcing is subsumed by the classic "make-or-buy" problem, numerous theoretical perspectives, including agency theory [32] and TCE [71, 74] , have been proposed to assess the economic value and risk of IT outsourcing. We reviewed the academic literature on IT outsourcing and identified five broad streams of research in this area.
Based on case study evidence, the earliest research on IT outsourcing focused on describing the business impact of IT outsourcing [14, 16, 46, 50] . Many of these studies highlight the benefits of IT outsourcing, including cost savings, increased strategic focus, improved efficiency, and access to the latest technologies, while paying little attention to the costs or risks that accompany outsourcing. A second research stream explored the drivers and antecedents of IT outsourcing, typically employing surveys to identify factors associated with a firm's decision to outsource [3, 6, 49, 67] . These studies found that firms experiencing financial difficulties or with poorly performing information systems (IS) departments were more likely to outsource certain IT resources.
A third research stream focused on managing the complex relationship between clients and IT vendor firms, identifying various types of outsourcing arrangements, such as partnerships and alliances, both from an economic perspective as well as from social and psychological perspectives [7, 22, 36, 37, 66] . Many of these studies employed strategic management theories (including strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, etc.) to articulate both positive and negative outcomes of outsourcing arrangements. A fourth research stream examined the risks of IT outsourcing [4, 5, 6, 19] . These studies have identified the risks of large-scale outsourcing relative to other alternatives, such as in-sourcing [42] , dual sourcing [38] , and selective sourcing [45] . Many of these risks have been conceptually articulated, but not yet empirically validated (see [6] for one exception).
Event Studies in the IS Literature
An emerging fifth stream has begun to employ content-based event studies, examining investors' reactions to IT outsourcing announcements. Our search identified four prior event studies of IT outsourcing announcements [20, 28, 51, 58] , reflecting the increasing popularity of event studies, more generally, in the IS literature. This includes seven studies of general IT investment announcements and several studies of miscellaneous phenomena, such as the announcement of new CIO positions [14] , enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems [29, 61, 63] , e-commerce initiatives [62, 69] , and other IT-related phenomena. Table 1 summarizes key details of each of the prior event studies, including the sample size, the event window examined, the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) related to the event, and findings from the specific hypotheses that were tested in the authors' regression analyses. Unfortunately, most researchers defined their event windows in slightly different ways, making it difficult to compare results precisely. Some researchers, for example, chose a twoday event window, either beginning on (e.g., [0, 1]) [29] or ending on the date of the announcement (e.g., [-1, 0]) [20, 28] , whereas others chose either a three-day (e.g., [-1, 1]) or a five-day window (e.g., [-2, 2]) centered on the event date [14, 51, 58] . Despite minor differences in the size of the event window, we summarize key findings across these event studies below.
Of the four prior event studies that examined IT outsourcing announcements [20, 28, 51, 58] , none of them found a statistically significant change in stock prices during a two-day window, although all four studies, on average, demonstrated a positive mean CAR, ranging from a "low" of 0.07 percent [51] to a "high" of 0.43 percent [20] for a two-day event window. When weighted by sample size, the average CAR for a two-day window in the four prior event studies was 0.35 percent-approximately one-third of 1 percent. One study [51] also reported a three-day event window and Fich [9] announcements. ***During Internet "bubble" (+) (5 percent) versus post-"bubble" (-) (0.1 percent). ([-1, 1]), where the average CAR was a statistically significant 1.04 percent (p < 0.05). Curiously, in that study, the market reacted favorably on days t = -1 and t = +1, rather than on the outsourcing announcement date, leading the authors to suspect information leakage prior to the date that the firm announced its outsourcing contract. In addition, prior event studies of IT outsourcing found that the market's reaction was more favorable for smaller firms than larger firms [28, 51] and for financially unhealthy firms than for healthy firms that announced their intention to outsource [51, 58] . In addition, some researchers hypothesized that the market's reaction would be more favorable to announcements by service-sector firms (e.g., banks), compared to manufacturing firms [28, 51, 58] , although these hypotheses received mixed support. Finally, prior studies posited that the firm's stated motives for IT outsourcing would affect the market's reaction, positing that outsourcing contracts mentioning a cost-cutting motive would have less favorable market responses compared to announcements mentioning strategic goals [20] or "vendor expertise" [58] . While the mean CARs that accompanied announcement of cost-reduction outsourcing contracts were generally lower than for outsourcing announcements that specified strategic objectives or vendor expertise, the authors neglected to conduct or report the statistical tests required to demonstrate whether these differences were statistically significant [20, 58] . 1 Among the remaining IT event studies that examined general IT investment announcements or other IT-related phenomena, there were few generalizable findings (see [17] for more details of prior event studies in the IS literature). No study reported statistically significant, positive CARs for their full sample of IT investment announcements, although most studies reported positive, nonsignificant CARs. Two studies reported statistically significant, negative CARs including a study of IT spending announcements in the U.S. retail sector [30] and a study of Japanese firms' IT investment announcements [64] . While no study reported statistically significant, positive CARs for its full data set, researchers reported significant, positive CARs for subsets of the announcements-such as for "innovative" rather than "follow-up" IT project investments [18] , for "transformational" rather than nontransformational IT projects [17] , and where the announcement came from the firm who was making the IT investment itself, rather than from the IT vendor or other party [56] .
While many event studies of IT outsourcing announcements or IT investments, in general, posited that the market's reaction would differ between service and manufacturing firms [28, 31, 51, 56] , few studies found support for the hypothesized differences. Thus, investors' reactions to IT outsourcing or other IT investment announcements by service-sector firms do not differ, as a whole, from those by manufacturing firms. However, when an expert analysis was included to identify whether the specific industry in which the client firm operates was undergoing IT-enabled transformation, one study found that IT investment announcements by firms within industries that were undergoing IT-enabled transformation generated more favorable market reactions, compared to firms in industries not undergoing transformation [17] . Thus, what seems to matter is the extent of IT-enabled transformation occurring in the specific industry in which the investing firm competes (e.g., retail banking), rather than general differences between service and manufacturing firms as a whole. Finally, two studies showed that the stated objective of the specific IT announcement mattered as well: if the specific IT investment was considered to be "transformational" [17] or "innovative" [18] by expert analysts, then investors' reaction was more favorable, compared to IT investments regarded as nontransformational, automationoriented [17] , or merely "follow-up" investments [18] to competitors' prior innovative moves.
Although prior event studies of IT outsourcing have contributed to our understanding of whether and how IT outsourcing announcements lead to significant abnormal returns in stock prices, little consideration has been given as to why researchers obtained such results. In fact, the four event studies of IT outsourcing announcements produced conflicting results, which limits our understanding of investors' true response to firms' IT outsourcing initiatives. For example, some event study researchers posited that IT outsourcing would have greater value to financial or service-sector firms [20, 28] , whereas others claimed that manufacturing firms or IT-sector firms would benefit more [20] . Our study extends prior work in this area by identifying a basis in theory for such conflicting predictions and results. In particular, we examine the specific transactional risks associated with IT outsourcing-a topic that has drawn significant topical interests in recent years, but which has only been studied conceptually to date [60] .
Hypotheses Development
IT OUTSOURCING IS AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL arrangement whereby client firms obtain necessary IT resources-both tangible and human-through external IT vendors rather than developing these resources internally [50] . IT service vendors (hereafter simply vendors) are therefore expected to assume full or partial responsibility for the client firm's IT requirements. Several theoretical perspectives have been employed to assess various types of risks with respect to IT outsourcing. Aubert et al. [5] identified three types of risks-agent risk, principal risk, and transaction risk. Generally, agent and principal risks arise due to discrepancies between the objectives of the principal (i.e., the client firm) and those of the agent (i.e., the vendor firm) [27] .
Agent risk results from agents' opportunistic behavior, whereby they seek to maximize their own self-interest at the expense of the principal or client [5] . Due to the high costs associated with the principal (client) monitoring the agent's (vendor's) behavior, the agent may be tempted to behave opportunistically as a result of moral hazard, adverse selection, and imperfect commitment. An agent's lack of experience for the specific activity being outsourced may exacerbate this risk. Principal risk, on the other hand, refers to the risks associated with the principal's lack of experience with the activities to be outsourced [5] . Principals (clients) who lack the knowledge required to evaluate the quality of the services provided by the vendor may incur risk because they are vulnerable to the agent's opportunistic behavior.
In contrast to agent and principal risk-both of which occur due to discrepancies between the goals of the two parties involved-transaction risk results from transac-tion-specific factors, including asset specificity, frequency, and interdependency. This study focuses on the impact of transaction risk in shaping the market's response to IT outsourcing announcements. While agent and principal risks can be assessed only post hoc (after implementing the contract and observing its consequences), transaction risk can be assessed at the time of the outsourcing announcement.
We have identified five constructs that reflect transactional risks based on various theoretical perspectives, including agency theory, TCE, and incomplete contracts theory. More specifically, transactional risks were identified over two dimensions: (1) the characteristics of the IT services to be outsourced or the contract itself (e.g., the size of the IT contract, the difficulty associated with monitoring vendor performance, and the degree of asset specificity) and (2) the characteristics of firms involved in the outsourcing arrangement (e.g., the vendor's ability to successfully complete the outsourcing project and the degree of cultural similarity between the client and vendor firms).
Contract Size
Resource dependence theory [59] posits that firms exchange resources to reduce uncertainty in order to remain competitive. IT outsourcing with the goal of securing resources and capabilities that are not available internally is a manifestation of resource dependency between client and vendor. Kern and Kreijger [35] argue that the level of resource dependency is a function of the perceived value of the resource for the client, the number of alternative suppliers available to provide a given service, and the cost of switching to another vendor if the vendor fails to meet its obligations.
The size of the outsourcing contract relative to the client firm's total size reflects the client firm's level of resource dependency on the outsourcing vendor. Intuitively, as the size of the contract increases (relative to the client firm's overall size), the client becomes more dependent on the vendor by virtue of having relinquished control over its internal resources. Barki et al. [8] demonstrated that the size of IT projects constitutes one dimension of its risk profile. They found a positive relationship between IT project size and project risk. The size of an IT outsourcing contract is also positively related to the strategic importance of the functions to be outsourced and to the level of switching costs required to substitute another IT vendor. Along these lines, Lacity et al. quoted a CFO who was frustrated with the service provided by his firm's IT vendor but saw no alternatives:
Once you sign with a vendor, you have no options. . . . So when you get into that situation, it's lose-lose for both parties. What are you going to do? Sue them? Fire them? Stop buying [their] services? There is nobody else, in a short period of time, who you can buy services from. [45, p. 17] Moreover, the cost associated with monitoring the vendor's performance grows as the size of the outsourcing contract increases [32] .
Through comparative analysis of 33 outsourcing case studies, Lacity and Willcocks [43] found that short-term contracts (i.e., less than four years) were more effective than long-term contracts in achieving anticipated IT cost savings. Although the duration of an IT outsourcing contract is not necessarily proportional to the size of the contract, contract duration and size are undoubtedly correlated. Contracts with long duration become more problematic when technological and business environment uncertainty exist. Within such turbulent or uncertain environments, it is difficult to predict future business and technology trends, thus exacerbating the downside risk of long-term and large contracts, due to the potential for technological discontinuities or paradigm shifts [44] . Consequently, we believe that investors will react negatively to larger outsourcing contracts due to high switching costs, monitoring costs, increased resource dependency, and the risk of suboptimal vendor performance.
Hypothesis 1: The market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements will be inversely related to the size of IT outsourcing contracts (adjusted for the client firm's size).

Difficulties in Performance Monitoring
From a game-theoretic perspective, many service providers are tempted to behave opportunistically by shirking (or otherwise failing to perform their best work) when performance is difficult for the principal (i.e., client) to monitor [6, 60] . Firms outsource IT resources for many reasons. One recent study noted that "competitiveness, time-tomarket, innovativeness, round-the-clock customer service, agility, and access to worldclass technology and skills are some of the [objectives] that are commonly echoed in the context of [IT] . . . outsourcing in the current business press" [25, p. 601]. Despite the diversity of possible outsourcing motives, these goals center on two overarching goals-efficiency and effectiveness. Specifically, IT outsourcing can help to reduce firms' IT spending or provide opportunities to better compete and expand in the marketplace [55] . These two motives for IT outsourcing have very different implications for monitoring the success of outsourcing initiatives. Traditionally, measuring the efficiency effects of IT (i.e., cost reduction) has been relatively easier than assessing the impact of IT on firms' effectiveness (e.g., revenue or market share growth) [55, 68, 72] . IT has a primary impact on transactional variables, including operating costs and cycle time, and therefore the impact of IT on efficiency outcomes is relatively easier to detect. In addition, cost reduction is more an internal matter and can easily be shown by comparing costs before and after deployment of new IT. However, attributing revenue growth or market share growth to IT investments is more difficult because these outcomes are influenced by various external factors, including competitors' moves, government regulation, foreign exchange rates, and so on. Hence, it is difficult to know for certain whether IT investments with the goal of improving strategic effectiveness have achieved their goals due to the many possible confounding factors.
The same trade-off occurs in assessing efficiency and effectiveness motives for IT outsourcing: it is easier to show that an IT outsourcing arrangement with the primary goal of cost reduction has achieved its goals, compared to an outsourcing arrangement that seeks to improve customer service, increase revenues, expand market share, and so on. When a client firm contracts with an IT vendor with the goal of enhancing its overall revenues, the vendor can attribute any failure to achieve this goal to the aforementioned external market factors or other unforeseen events. From the client's perspective, it is impossible to prove that revenue growth or market share growth are due to new and improved IT systems or services in the face of so many other, confounding factors.
Enhancing revenues through IT (i.e., so-called strategic IS) often requires a substantial time lag to demonstrate its impact in terms of better customer service, increased product variety, new market segments, and so on [34] . Measuring operational efficiencies associated with outsourcing initiatives that seek to reduce costs is direct, tangible, and is less confounded by external factors. Thus, we posit that:
Hypothesis 2: The market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements will be positively related to IT outsourcing contracts with a stated goal of cost reduction.
Asset Specificity A resource can be described as asset specific if "it cannot readily be reused by other firms because of site specificity, physical asset specificity, or human asset specificity" [54, p. 486] . Asset specificity is a critical attribute of IT because many IT resources are proprietary by nature-that is, they are developed to satisfy a firm's specific requirements (e.g., custom software) [2] . Therefore, highly asset-specific IT resources cannot be easily sold or redeployed for other purposes. From the perspective of TCE, client firms that outsource IT functions that are highly asset specific (e.g., proprietary software) are likely to incur greater transactional risk than firms who outsource commodity-type IT resources (e.g., firms who hire a vendor to oversee system maintenance, data center operations, or their telecommunications infrastructure).
There are two underlying reasons for this. First, due to the fact that the termination value of specific IT assets is very low (because they cannot be redeployed elsewhere), the vendor is less concerned about the client's potential decision to terminate the contract for nonperformance. The low termination value may therefore encourage some vendors to behave opportunistically by maximizing their own self-interest at the client's expense (i.e., shirking). Prior studies based on TCE have identified various forms of opportunistic behavior, including negligence, suboptimal performance, and shirking [6, 74] . Second, when proprietary resources are managed by the vendor, even if the vendor does not meet its commitments, it is difficult and costly for the client firm to substitute another vendor. Switching to another vendor, particularly after the vendor has assumed control, usually results in significant delays and a new learning curve for working with a new vendor. These costs will often outweigh any benefits of terminating a nonperforming vendor [52] , although this phenomenonlabeled back-sourcing or re-insourcing-is becoming increasingly common [57] . Consequently, clients may encounter a "lock-in" scenario, in which they may become potential "hostages" of service providers who may shirk their duties by failing to uphold the contract terms. Along these lines, two prior studies posited a negative relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing success [2, 26] . In summary, when a client firm outsources IT assets that are high in asset specificity, this enhances the risk of a vendor's opportunistic behavior, allowing the vendor to pursue its own interests "with guile" [74] . Thus, investors should react negatively to IT outsourcing announcements involving a client's decision to outsource highly asset-specific IT resources:
Hypothesis 3: The stock market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements will be inversely related to the degree to which the IT resources to be outsourced are asset specific.
Cultural Similarity
Lee and Kim [47] posit that the level of partnership between a client and vendor firm will increase when high levels of cultural similarity exist between them. Their argument is based on prior case studies [46, 66] showing that, when the client and vendor firms are culturally similar, IT outsourcing is more often successful than when the firms are culturally dissimilar. For example, in a case study of insurance firm USAA and its IT outsourcing vendor, Lasher et al. [46] cited "cultural similarity" as one reason for the success of the outsourcing arrangement. Similarly, in comparing seven case studies of IT outsourcing projects, Sabherwal [66] noted that identification-based trust (a construct akin to cultural similarity) was associated with successful outsourcing partnerships. He drew upon the notion of identification-based trust [48] to argue that better outcomes will occur during outsourcing arrangements when mutual understanding allows both "parties [to] effectively understand and appreciate the other's wants" [48, p. 119] . A similar argument has been proposed in the strategy literature for the success of IT alliances among high-tech firms [75] , drawing on Zucker's [76] notion of character-based trust.
In their empirical study of 74 IT outsourcing contracts, Lee and Kim [47] found several behaviors that were linked to cultural similarity, which, in turn, predicted improved outsourcing partnership outcomes, such as information sharing behavior and the overall quality of communication between firms. Similar themes regarding the importance of a "cultural fit" have circulated in the business strategy literature for decades. Fitzgerald and Willcocks identified "the existence of a cultural fit between the client and vendor organizations" [22, p. 94] as one antecedent of IT outsourcing partnership, while other researchers [33] stressed the importance of recognizing and managing cultural similarities and dissimilarities in IT outsourcing relationships [36, 37] . Finally, Copeland and Weston [15] found that industrial relatedness was a key antecedent of successful mergers and acquisitions because mergers between firms in related industries outperformed those among firms in unrelated industries. 2 The notion of "cultural similarity" may be interpreted in various ways because culture is known to vary across organizations, industries, and societies. Interestingly, Pothukuchi et al. [62] found that differences in organizational culture are more problematic in creating international joint ventures, compared to differences in national culture. They concluded that firms from different industries had more difficulties understanding and collaborating with each other, compared to firms from different countries but in the same industry. It seems plausible that outsourcing arrangements between a client and vendor that operate in the same industry (e.g., both in the IT industry) will benefit from higher levels of understanding and information sharing than comparable arrangements between clients and vendors from different industries (e.g., a manufacturing client versus an IT vendor). When the client and vendor belong to the same industry, members are more likely to share a common language, socialization, institutional history, and organizational practices, which enable them to communicate their needs more effectively [48] . Moreover, the similarity in their business processes and products will allow the client to better evaluate and monitor the vendor's performance, thereby limiting potential opportunistic behavior on the part of the vendor.
Hypothesis 4: The market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements will be positively related to the cultural similarity of the client and vendor firms.
Vendor Size
The market's reaction may also be contingent on a vendor's resource availability as well as its capability to successfully carry out its duties since these are key factors that determine outsourcing success. Larger outsourcing vendors, such as EDS and CSC, have accumulated a substantial amount of business and technical expertise while leveraging their economies of scale and scope in managing such resources. Relative to smaller service providers, large vendors are also likely to possess more highly skilled human resources and leading-edge technological infrastructures-both elements necessary to provide high-quality services and maintain long-term relationships with clients.
An IT vendor's size is also often directly linked to its public reputation, which, in turn, signals to potential clients the vendor's reliability, dependability, and trustworthiness. Many consumers, particularly those who are less price sensitive, are willing to pay higher fees to reduce the risks that might otherwise be incurred when dealing with vendors lacking an established reputation and track record. In the worst case, when an outsourcing contract is terminated due to a vendor's nonperformance, larger vendors will have the financial resources to compensate the client for any potential losses. For these reasons, the revenues of "name brand" IT consultants (i.e., Accenture and IBM) have dramatically increased over the years, despite the fact that their billing rates are consistently higher than the average market price.
We hypothesize that an IT vendor's size influences the market's perception by reducing investors' perception of risk (although this is contingent on the outsourcing contract size relative to the vendor's size). For example, outsourcing contracts worth $500 million are commonly awarded to the largest IT vendors and, as a result, investors are less likely to perceive significant operational risks arising from such contracts due to insufficient resources or capabilities on the vendor's part. In contrast, an equiva-lent contract awarded to a lesser-known vendor would likely raise concerns among investors due to the vendors' potential lack of resources or expertise. In addition, since small vendors are rarely involved in such large contracts, investors may lack sufficient information (based on prior history) to evaluate their track record. For these reasons, investors are likely to perceive lower levels of risk when the announced contract is made with a large, reputable IT vendor. 
Research Methods
Data
WE EMPLOYED LEXISNEXIS TO IDENTIFY articles and press releases about IT outsourcing for a nine-year period between 1995 and 2003, using several key word phrases. These key words were carefully selected based on a combination of terms describing IT and a set of action verbs describing an outsourcing arrangement (e.g., outsource, purchase, sign, contract, etc.). Since many outsourcing initiatives are publicly labeled as partnerships or take the form of buyer alliances [24] , we also employed terms such as partnership, alliance, and consortium to search for such arrangements.
Two graduate students were hired to initially filter thousands of news articles retrieved from our search, of which a total of 282 were identified as relevant. Many of the articles that we excluded were related to outsourcing of non-IT resources (e.g., manufacturing subcontracting) or announcements by IT vendors of new services that were not related to any specific client. The next step in filtering these articles involved the first author reading all 282 announcements and conducting additional LexisNexis searches to determine if any confounding events occurred within three days of the IT outsourcing announcement (i.e., the "event date"). This step of eliminating confounding events is very important in event study research in order to prevent the results from being contaminated by unrelated events occurring within the event "window" to be examined. At this stage, 90 announcements were eliminated for a variety of reasons, either because (1) the article announced the completion or renewal of a preexisting IT outsourcing arrangement, (2) there was another announcement by the same client firm within the three-day "window" surrounding the announcement (e.g., a new CEO, a new product announcement, or quarterly earnings statement), or (3) the financial data to perform the event analysis were not available from the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). After eliminating these 90 announcements, this left a final sample of 192 announcements. Our sample size is relatively large both in comparison to the average sample size for the four event studies of IT outsourcing (mean n = 91) and relative to the average sample size for all 17 prior ISrelated event studies (mean n = 127). 3 
Constructs and Measures
Cumulative Abnormal Returns CARs indicate the extent to which investors adjust their beliefs about a firm's value due to recent events. Positive CARs are likely to occur when most investors perceive that the new "event" will result in significant future cash flows. Conversely, negative CARs occur when investors hold pessimistic views regarding the impact of the event on future cash flows. With respect to the methods for computing the CARs, we followed the conventional procedures employed in prior IT event studies [18] . The market model that we used to compute CARs is as follows:
where R mt is the rate of return on the equally weighted market portfolio on day t; R jt is the rate of return for firm j on day t; α j and β j are the intercept and slope parameter for firm j, respectively; and ε jt is the error term for firm j on day t. We performed three steps to compute the CARs associated with each announcement. First, we determined the parameters (α[ j and β{ j ) of α j and β j for the market model by using daily stock returns for a 200-day period from day -230 to day -30 (where 0 is the event date). Second, we computed the average abnormal returns (A jt ) for each firm by subtracting the returns during the event window surrounding the announcement where t is defined in trading days relative to the event date. Third, we computed the CARs by aggregating the average abnormal returns for the test period:
where t 1 is the beginning trading day and t 2 is the ending trading day for the period. Consistent with prior event studies [17, 18, 31] , in order to identify the statistical significance of CARs around the event date, we employed the standardized abnormal return method and calculated Z-statistics using the standard abnormal returns for each firm on day t.
More importantly, we also conducted a regression analysis (shown in Equation (1)) using the CAR as the dependent variable and the five variables corresponding to H1-H5 (plus an intercept term) as the independent variables. We also included two control variables (Industry and MarkCon): the industry dummy variable (Industry) distinguishes between service-sector and manufacturing-sector firms, while the market condition variable (MarkCon) is used to control for the potential effect of general market conditions (e.g., "bull" or "bear" markets) on the overall CARs. 
Measures of Independent Variables
Contract Size
The size of the outsourcing contract was used as a proxy to represent the client firm's level of resource dependency on the IT vendor, based on our prior argument that resource dependency increases in proportion to the size of the outsourcing contract. The amount of the contacts ranged from $1 million to $5 billion. Unfortunately, onehalf of the 192 announcements did not provide the dollar amount of the contract, perhaps due to confidentiality reasons; the other 96 announcements provided such information, which we included in our analysis. 4 Given that investors' perception of transactional risk arising from the size of the contract is likely to vary contingent on the client's size, we used the client firm's total assets (as reported by Compustat) to normalize the outsourcing contract size (i.e., contract size divided by total client assets).
Performance Monitoring
Difficulty in monitoring the vendor's performance is a potential source of transaction risk. As described above, the performance impact of IT investments seeking to reduce costs or improve operational efficiency is relatively easier to monitor than IT investments seeking to increase revenues or market share, or to improve customer service quality [72] . We used a dummy variable, coding as "0" those announcements that mentioned a goal of cost reduction or increased efficiency, and we coded as "1" any announcements that mentioned "strategic growth," "market share growth," "customer service improvements," or other improvements in effectiveness.
Asset Specificity
We coded all events into two groups, based on asset specificity. We used another dummy variable, with code values of "1" if the outsourced resources were high in asset specificity and "0" otherwise. We classified IT resources as high in asset specificity if they mentioned (1) licensed and patented technologies; (2) proprietary technologies for which the client contracted with the vendor (and thus, these assets presumably could not be readily resold or redeployed by competitors) [2] ; and (3) IT infrastructure or applications that were to be codeveloped jointly by the client and vendor firms. Conversely, we classified announcements as low in asset specificity if the functions to be outsourced included the management of data centers, PCs, telecommunications networks, or other "commodity" resources. We coded as low asset specificity any outsourcing announcement that mentioned support or maintenance of existing hardware or software resources, rather than development of new applications.
Cultural Similarity
Four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are the most common way to classify firms by industry. Based on the four-digit SIC codes, we used the first two digits to identify IT industries [11] , coding a dummy variable as "1" (i.e., high cultural similarity) if both client and vendor were in IT industries, otherwise we coded it as "0" (i.e., low cultural similarity if client and vendor came from different industries). We define firms with the first two digits of the SIC code as "73" as being in the IT industry.
In addition, to identify IT firms that do not share the same SIC codes, we individually validated the client firms in the sample to determine whether they either sell or develop IT products or services. Through this method, we finally identified that 61 of the client firms were from the IT industry out of the total set of announcements.
Vendor Size
The size of each IT vendor was estimated based on the amount of total assets owned by the vendor in the year prior to the announcement. As we did with the client firm size, we also normalized the vendor's size by dividing its total assets by the size of the IT outsourcing contract because the market's assessment of transactional risk related to the vendor is contingent on the actual amount of the outsourcing contract. We employed a logarithmic transformation to correct for nonnormality in the distribution of this ratio (defined as total assets divided by contract size).
Other Control Variables
We employ two more variables-Industry and MarkCon. As explained above, the Industry dummy variable distinguishes between manufacturing versus service-sector firms because this was found to be relevant in prior events studies [10, 18] . Note that a classification of the industry codes for nine out of 192 companies was performed through a manual search of the firms' annual reports due to the lack of availability of Compustat data. We also used MarkCon as a dummy variable to control for general market conditions, such as favorable market conditions (e.g., a "bull market," as occurred from 1995 to 1999) or unfavorable conditions (e.g., a "bear market," as occurred from 2000 to 2003).
Test Method and Regression Samples
To test Equation (1), we employed median regression techniques [39] , rather than ordinary least square (OLS) regression, because the latter assumes homoskedasticity of the error distribution. Our data were heteroskedastic (rather than homoskedastic), a phenomenon defined by inequality of error variances along the regression line. Median regression (also called quantile regression) is used as a robust alternative method to resolve problems associated with heteroskedastic error terms and to provide more accurate parameter estimates [12, 40] . 5 Median regression has been employed widely in the finance literature for data with similar, heteroskedastic error terms [1] . Our median regression analyses were limited to outsourcing announcements with data corresponding to all five constructs corresponding to H1-H5. Since median regression analysis requires that cases with missing data be deleted, our median regression analysis omitted 105 cases that were missing one or more data elements. (Of the total 192 announcements, we deleted 96 cases from the median regression because contract size data were not publicly available. We deleted another nine cases due to missing data in one of the other constructs.) The median regression analyses were based on 87 cases, which is still large, relative to the data sets for the event studies summarized in Table 1 .
Results
ALTHOUGH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE of our study was to investigate the factors that influence investors' perceptions of IT outsourcing risks, we begin by summarizing the overall market reaction to all 192 of the IT outsourcing announcements that we analyzed. Table 2 shows the average abnormal returns and the specific distribution of positive and negative CARs for each trading day, beginning five days before to five days after the announcement. The results show that investors react favorably to outsourcing announcements on the actual date of the announcement, with a mean abnormal return of +0.31 percent (p < 0.10). In contrast, the abnormal returns for the other days within our 11-day interval were not significant. In terms of the distribution of positive and negative CARs, there was an even split between positive and negative CARs on the event date (i.e., 95: 97).
In order to compare our results with prior outsourcing event studies, we examined the CARs of several different event windows close to the event date (Table 3) . It should be noted that making a direct comparison of the CARs, based on an event window, with those reported in previous studies requires a careful interpretation because of the differences in the samples used (i.e., sample size, data periods, etc.). Nevertheless, it is worth performing these comparisons on various event windows in order to validate that the significant CARs that we observed were specifically tied to the event announcement and were not an artifact of random fluctuation. Overall, our CARs are consistent with those of earlier studies. For example, the mean CARs in our study are +0.54 percent and +0.47 percent for the two-day (e.g., [0, 1]) and three-day (e.g., [-1, +1]) event windows, respectively. Given slight differences in the length of event windows, interpreting our CARs in light of those reported in prior IT outsourcing event studies (e.g., [20, 28, 51, 58] ) may be problematic. Nevertheless, the mean CAR in our study is somewhat higher than the weighted average value of +0.35 percent from similar two-day event windows in the earlier event studies of IT outsourcing announcements. When compared only to the prior studies (e.g., [20, 51, 58] ) employing the exact same two-day window, our average CAR is somewhat higher than the average CAR (+0.345 percent) of these earlier studies. Our finding of an overall positive CAR for the two-day window is not only larger than the weighted mean CAR of the prior studies, but our result is statistically significant (p < 0.05), in contrast to the prior studies-none of which reported a statistically significant finding for a two-day window. (One prior event study [51] found a significant result for a three-day window ([-1, 1] ) of 1.05 percent (p < 0.05), as shown in Table 1 .) Table 3 displays the CARs for eight different windows, each of which was used in prior studies. Similar to the average abnormal returns, a significant market reaction occurred during the event window (e.g., [0, 1] and [0, 2]) for the overall set of announcements (p < 0.05), while no statistically significant effect was found for either the preevent or postevent intervals. Because we specifically examined the market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements rather than general IT investments, comparing the CARs between these two different types of IT-related announcements can be misleading. Nevertheless, we report our CARs through the same windows that were used in prior event studies of general IT investment announcements (e.g., [13, 17, 18, 31, 56] ).
Similar to average abnormal returns, while the average two-day CAR in our study was a positive 0.54 percent, investors did not react favorably to all 192 outsourcing announcements. Instead, their reactions were symmetrically distributed in terms of their reaction on the event date: 103 announcements triggered a positive response, while 89 others yielded a negative response. This roughly symmetric distribution of results suggests that investors react not to the mere fact of an IT outsourcing announcement per se but, rather, they react to specific details contained in the announcement, as we will show in evaluating H1-H5 below. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 4 (for all 192 announcements) and Table 5 (for the 87 announcements containing full data), including the proportional ratio of the dichotomized "dummy" variables. Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients for all constructs in our model. According to Table  6 , the dependent variable (CAR) is negatively related to the client firm's capability for performance monitoring (p < 0.10). Asset specificity itself is inversely related to contract size (p < 0.10) and significantly related to performance monitoring ability (p < 0.05). In particular, the degree of asset specificity is significantly related to the stated goal of the outsourcing contract (cost reduction or revenue enhancing) (p < 0.01). We note that outsourcing announcements with the stated goal of cost reduction appear to be less asset specific (based on the correlation matrix), compared to outsourcing announcements that specify revenue enhancement or growth in market share. This makes sense, given that revenue enhancing arrangements are more focused on strategic growth and thus often require development of new applications (which have high asset specificity). In contrast, outsourcing with the stated goal of cost reduction focuses on having the vendor manage existing IT resources that are more "standardized," such as operating and maintaining existing infrastructure (which have low asset specificity). We also note an inverse relationship between contract size and asset specificity (r = -0.21; p < 0.05), suggesting that larger outsourcing contracts tend to be less asset specific. Table 7 reports a summary of the regression results for the overall model shown in Equation (1) . Median regression employs the value of pseudo R 2 to represent the total amount of variance explained in the dependent variable. 6 We conducted two sets of regression analyses, consistent with other event studies in this area. Since about 50 percent of the announcements omitted details of the contract amount and since median regression requires listwise deletion of missing data, we conducted one set of regression analyses with the full set of announcements (n = 192), but omitting the two variables (contract size and vendor size) with many missing cases (corresponding to H1 and H5, respectively). We also repeated the regression analyses, retaining these two variables (contract size and vendor size), but using listwise deletion, as required by median regression procedures (resulting in a smaller n = 87). We thus performed two different sets of median regression equations, trading off a larger number of cases (n = 192) but fewer predictor variables (three) with a smaller number of cases (n = 87) but more predictor variables (five). The two sets of results provide complementary, yet consistent, insights into the factors that explain investors' reactions to IT outsourcing. For the first median regression analysis (with all five predictor variables and n = 87), the pseudo R 2 was 0.17, thus indicating that 17 percent of the variance in the CARs was explained. In support of H1, there was a negative relationship between relative outsourcing contract size and investors' reactions (p < 0.01). Also, as predicted by H2, the client firm's ability to monitor the vendor's performance was significantly associated with investors' reactions (p < 0.1). In support of H3, the level of asset specificity of the outsourced functions is inversely associated with investors' reactions (p < 0.01). In contrast to our stated H4, however, industry similarity was negatively-rather than positively-related to the market's reaction (p < 0.01). Finally, vendor size was significantly related to investors' reactions, supporting H5 (p < 0.05). Thus, four of the five hypotheses were confirmed-with the exception of H4 (which lacked support).
In the second median regression analysis (based on the full data set of 192, but omitting the two variables with many missing cases [contract size and vendor size]), the results are largely consistent with those above. However, H2, corresponding to the client's ability to monitor vendor performance, was not significant when the size variables were omitted. CAR. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (based on a one-tailed test)
Discussion and Implications IN COMPARING THE RESULTS OF OUR TWO SETS of regression analyses, we see that the results were largely consistent with each other. Contract size (H1) was inversely related to investors' reactions, as we predicted. Performance monitoring (H2), as we predicted, was inversely related to investors' reactions when all other predictor variables were included in the regression equation. This result indicates that investors react favorably to IT outsourcing announcements that specify cost reduction motives. Interestingly, however, this hypothesis was not supported in the second set of analyses-when contract size and vendor size were omitted as predictor variables. We believe the reason for this difference in results stems from the fact that performance monitoring and contract size were moderately but inversely correlated with each other (r = -0.18), suggesting that for larger contracts, the stated motive for outsourcing was likely to be strategic growth rather than cost reduction. Since it is more difficult to monitor the vendor's performance for such strategic growth outsourcing arrangements, the performance monitoring construct no longer provides a meaningful signal to investors. An alternative explanation for the inconsistent results is that the effect for the client's ability to monitor the vendor's performance may be weaker when investors regard the IT vendor as a well-known, reputable firm (because investors then perceive that the outsourcing contract will be well managed, regardless of the stated goal); however, if the vendor firm is a smaller, lesser-known, or less-reputable firm, then the relationship between clients' ability to monitor performance and investors' reactions may be a stronger one (because then investors only have confidence in the vendor if the stated goal is cost reduction, but not strategic growth). It is possible that the overall results for H2 were inconsistent between the different median regression analyses because we did not explicitly include this contingency moderator vari-able such as IT leadership. Future research should explicitly state and test for this moderator relationship for vendor reputation. 7 Asset specificity (H3), as predicted, was inversely related to investors' reactions in both sets of analyses. Thus, investors are more skeptical about the likely returns to client firms who outsource highly asset-specific resources (e.g., development of custom software) than with regard to outsourcing commodity IT resources (e.g., application maintenance or management of data centers). The results for cultural similarity (H4) were not supported. Cultural similarity was significant, but in the opposite direction from what we predicted (which we discuss below). Finally, as predicted, vendor size, as normalized by contract amount, was positively related to investors' reaction (H5).
We found contract size (H1) to be negatively associated with the market's reaction, which suggests that investors perceive larger outsourcing contracts as posing greater risk. Similarly, investors perceive high risks when smaller vendors are awarded large contracts (H5). Moreover, outsourcing announcements involving IT resources that are high in asset specificity were associated with negative investor reactions (H3). Thus, investors are more skeptical about the likely returns to client firms who outsource highly asset-specific resources (e.g., development of custom software) than they are about outsourcing of commodity IT resources (e.g., application maintenance or management of data centers). The potential problem of vendor opportunism and lock-in that results from outsourcing highly specific assets [52] appears to contribute to the market's negative reaction. Current trends in IT outsourcing are moving to more specialized and segmented arrangements, as seen by the emergence of short-term, application service provider (ASP)-based arrangements that feature "utility-based" pricing models (e.g., pay as you go). In addition, outsourcing arrangements have become increasingly more complex with the advent of more selective outsourcing arrangements [45] and the proliferation of multiple vendor arrangements [24] . In a fastchanging and uncertain environment, the sorts of huge, long-term outsourcing contracts, reflecting in the earlier era of "total outsourcing" [4, 50] , may pose significant risk to the client firm and are countered by current trends.
To our knowledge, ours is the first event study to investigate the importance of cultural similarity (or industry relatedness) between client and vendor firms within the context of IT outsourcing arrangements. Thus, we examined, based on market data, the notions of "cultural similarity," which have previously been discussed in case studies [22, 46] as well as in the strategic management literature to date [75, 76] . Our results, however, suggest that the extent of cultural similarity (or industry relatedness) between the client and vendor firms negatively rather than positively influences the market's reaction to outsourcing announcements. We hypothesized that some transactional risks can be mitigated when the two parties belong to the same industry and thus share greater familiarity and understanding of each other. As a result of such similarity, we posited that the strength of the partnership between client and vendor would be greater due to identification-based [48, 66] or character-based [76] trust. We also posited that, due to the similarity in their products and processes, the client firm could more effectively monitor and evaluate the vendor's performance, reducing the risk that the vendor may behave opportunistically. Having similar work practices, norms, and routines, as well as familiarity with the client firm's products, should also allow the vendor to provide a higher level of customer service.
Surprisingly, the results indicate exactly the opposite; that is, the greater the cultural similarity, the more negative was investors' reaction to outsourcing announcements. In particular, announcements made by IT client firms produce less favorable market reactions (mean CAR = 0.13 percent) than those by their non-IT counterparts (mean CAR = 0.48 percent), a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01). We consider several potential reasons for this result. First, IT client firms outsource highly asset-specific resources relative to non-IT firms. For example, many IT firms are engaged in codevelopment of IT products through partnerships with their IT service providers, which increases the risk of such arrangements (due to the risk of "hold up" and other uncertainties surrounding the profitability of new IT products). Second, IT client firms tend to write outsourcing contracts that are large in monetary terms, compared to their non-IT counterparts, which also increases risk and contributes to the generally negative market reaction. In addition, outsourcing arrangements by IT firms may be viewed by investors as an attempt to avoid large R&D expenditures, by "buying" available products and services from the marketplace. Moreover, firms in the IT industry are typically more vulnerable to general market fluctuations, so they are "less stable" in producing future cash flows, compared to non-IT firms. A cursory review of "high-tech" firms whose stocks were sold on the NASDAQ index during the period covered by our data set would immediately confirm this explanation. Finally, firms engaged in outsourcing contracts with other firms in the same industry (i.e., the IT sector) could be regarded as technically "hiring" their competitors. In this respect, it may be that there is a greater propensity for the vendor to behave opportunistically. 8 Taken together, these explanations seem to outweigh the benefits of any cultural similarity that client firms from the IT industry may share with their IT vendors, leading to more negative outcomes for such IT outsourcing announcements. At this point, these explanations are speculative; therefore, future research is required to empirically test these factors to see if they actually explain the contrary results we found for H4.
Our study has featured several implications for both research and practice. From the research perspective, our study provides insights into the reasons for a lack of statistically significant findings in some prior event studies related to IT investments. A nonsignificant market response was observed in all four prior event studies of IT outsourcing announcements [20, 28, 51, 58] for a two-day event window and in nearly all studies of general IT investment announcements [13, 17, 18, 31, 56] . 9 This lack of positive, significant results has not been adequately explained to date. Moreover, the assumption of positive market returns made by previous researchers studying IT outsourcing should be reconsidered because investors regard IT departments as cost centers rather than profit centers.
Drawing from hypotheses grounded in TCE and agency theory, we have shown the risks associated with various types of IT outsourcing arrangements. Our results help to evaluate claims that have long been the subject of speculation, based on anecdotal evidence or case studies regarding the importance of factors such as asset specificity [52] , contract size [45] , or cultural similarity between client and vendor firms [46, 66] . Future research should expand upon our results to include other factors that influence investors' reactions to IT outsourcing announcements. Other firm-and industry-level characteristics such as the client firm's growth potential and the level of market concentration in the industry may explain some of the variance that was not explained in our study.
In addition, although we found no significant differences in the average CARs for the outsourcing announcements with full contract details (e.g., contract amount) and those lacking such information (see Tables 4 and 5 ), further investigation is necessary to shed light on why so many firms omit such details in their outsourcing announcements. Interviews with key decision makers in client firms may help to explain their reasons for releasing (or withholding) such information about the contract amount. It may be that savvy client firms know that releasing contract details for very large or long-term IT outsourcing contracts trigger concern among investors, and hence, they withhold such information. One prior study showed that IT investment announcements were more favorably received by investors when the source of the announcement was the client firm itself, rather than another party, such as the IT vendor whose products or services were being purchased [56] . This suggests that client firms know when it is in their best interest to withhold such contractual details-or to refrain from publicly announcing the contract altogether. Given recent evidence that some IT investments take at least three years postimplementation to achieve any financial benefit, client managers may wish to withhold information about their intention to engage in large-scale IT investments or outsourcing contracts until they can be certain of favorable outcomes. Future research should also examine the impact of other risks associated with IT outsourcing (i.e., agent and principal risk), which have been discussed in the IS literature [5, 6] but not examined with the event study methodology. In particular, specific determinants of agent risk (such as the vendor's prior experience with similar projects) should be explored in order to understand how agent risk adds to or complements the type of transactional risks that we have examined here.
Our findings offer several useful contributions to practitioners who must make decisions regarding IT outsourcing. Although a further examination is needed to substantiate our findings, executives should expect a negative reaction from investors when they announce IT outsourcing initiatives related to highly asset-specific resources (e.g., development of customized or proprietary software). Also, practitioners should recognize that larger contracts are negatively perceived by investors, despite the presumed benefits of economies of scale in IT vendors' operations [45] . Our findings can help practitioners to maximize the information value of outsourcing arrangements by knowing what information to disclose (and what information to withhold) when they announce their outsourcing plans. In addition, the findings of this study help practitioners understand what types of outsourcing arrangements will likely enhance the market value of their firms and which ones are detrimental to firm value in light of investors' perceptions of the risks incurred by the firm. These insights may help practitioners to minimize the potential financial damages that may occur in the form of reduced share price due to negative market reactions to IT outsourcing contracts that are large in monetary terms or otherwise perceived as risky (due to asset specificity or due to a large contract relative to the vendor's size).
In fact, considering that the majority of the announcements are typically made by vendors [49] rather than by client firms-with the vendor's anticipation of positive effects on their own stock prices-client firms may wish to stipulate that their vendors not publicly broadcast the contract details. This is especially the case when the client is contracting with the vendor for highly asset-specific services and technologies as well as for very large or long-term contracts. Practitioners should recognize that the market does not appear to welcome large-scale outsourcing arrangements. Therefore, they may be better off to avoid disclosing the contract details and to forbid vendors from exploiting such informational details in the pursuit of their own interests. Given this insight, it is not surprising that nearly one-half of the announcements in our study failed to specify the size of the outsourcing contract. One way to ensure that the vendor observes the client's request for nondisclosure of contract size and other sensitive information is to explicitly state this in the contract and require the vendor to pay a penalty for any decrease in the client firm's valuation that results from a breach of the agreement. While this may restrict vendor firms from using such information as a basis for their own self-promotion (e.g., in marketing literature), such efforts would protect the client's interests by ensuring that vendors withhold specific contract details whose disclosure may reduce the client's stock price.
Finally, in terms of generalizing our results to other types of alliances or contracts that occur between firms, it is interesting to consider whether similar results would be obtained from other types of outsourcing arrangements, such as business process outsourcing (BPO) agreements among firms. BPO, defined as the movement of standard business process outside of the firm's boundaries to a service provider, has attracted widespread attention, as this phenomenon has become increasingly common in recent years [70, 73] . While we consider this a worthwhile area for future research, we hesitate to generalize our results beyond the context in which our data were collected (i.e., IT outsourcing). While the same types of transaction cost factors that we examined in our study may also apply to BPO agreements among firms, we cannot extend our findings with certainty to BPO events, given the differences in the types of functions in question and investors' general lack of experience in evaluating such arrangements. We hope to conduct future research in this area.
Conclusion
TO OUTSOURCE OR NOT TO OUTSOURCE IT RESOURCES is a strategic decision that may critically affect a firm's performance, both in the short run (in terms of changes in its stock price) and in the long run (in terms of its ability to satisfy customer needs, deliver new products to the market, leverage the latest technologies, etc.) [6, 42] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that employs event study methods to examine the impact of transactional risks associated with IT outsourcing on the market's reaction to IT outsourcing announcements. Interestingly, our data show that investors exhibit varied responses regarding the business value of IT outsourcing-slightly over one-half of the announcements triggered a positive response, while nearly half produced a negative response. As our detailed regression analysis shows, in seeking to understand why investors react positively in some cases and negatively in others, "the devil is in the details." Investors react favorably to outsourcing when the level of transactional risk is low, while, not surprisingly, reacting negatively to outsourcing arrangements that pose high transactional risk for the client firm.
According to the four hypotheses that were supported, the relative size of the contract, an inability to monitor the vendor's performance, the asset specificity of the IT resources to be outsourced, and, finally, the relative size of the vendor are the key drivers of investors' negative reactions to certain IT outsourcing announcements. These findings suggest that investors understand the potential transaction risks that accompany the transfer of responsibility for managing IT resources from client to vendor firms. Investors will "bid up" the stock prices of client firms that are able to pursue low-risk outsourcing engagements, while punishing clients that become entangled in outsourcing contracts that pose a high level of risk.
Recently, a new wave of IT outsourcing practices has emerged, in the form of shortterm ASP-based arrangements, utility-based pricing, and open source systems outsourcing. These new modes of outsourcing practices can serve as alternatives to help client firms mitigate the transaction risks embodied in traditional IT outsourcing arrangements. These alternatives help to further the commoditization of IT resources, which, from the client firm's perspective, helps to reduce the degree of asset specificity of IT resources, thus minimizing transactional risk even further. Moreover, open source and utility-based outsourcing practices can help to moderate the risks associated with the client's dependency on the vendor (and the resulting switching costs). As a result, these options may greatly mitigate the risks that arise from the large and long-term "total outsourcing" arrangement that were common in the early to mid1990s (e.g., [4, 50] ). The movement toward the new, more flexible outsourcing paradigms may allow client firms greater agility in responding to business and technological uncertainty, and enable them to fully leverage leading-edge technologies in a costeffective manner. We believe that these burgeoning trends will continue to gain momentum, and we plan to conduct ongoing research on such novel organizational practices in the future.
cost-cutting IT outsourcing initiatives). Moreover, Farag and Krishnan [20] report only partial results for various event windows in their research-in-progress conference paper, making it difficult to identify consistent results for a specific event window. Farag and Krishnan reported that strategic outsourcing announcements led to more favorable market results relative to costcutting outsourcing announcements (which had negative CARs), however, they did not report any statistical comparisons of the respective mean CARs.
2. In addition to reasons of cultural similarity, this makes sense in terms of economic theory because mergers among firms in the same industry lead to economies of scale and scope [65] and opportunities for cross-selling [21] .
3. We did not include Dehning et al.'s [17] sample size of n = 353 in this computation because their sample size was an outlier due to their consolidation of the data sets from three prior event studies [13, 18, 31] .
4. We performed an analysis for potential selection bias to determine if the sample of announcements containing information about the contract was significantly different from those excluding it [53] . Since the results from a Levene's test indicated that the variance for the CARs was statistically equivalent, a t-test was performed to determine the equality of the means. The results showed that the mean CARs for the two groups (those including and those excluding the contract amount) were not significantly different (p < 0.05), thus showing no selection bias.
5. In contrast to OLS, which seeks to minimize the sum of squared errors, median regression seeks to minimize the sum of the absolute deviations from the mean. This method allows error terms to change as a function of independent variables and, thus, can precisely estimate the statistical significance for models that are subject to various heteroskedastic error terms (independently and not identically distributed) and homogeneous (independent and identically distributed) error terms [41] . This method is also known as the least absolute value (LAV) model.
6. Median regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to approximate the explanatory power of the model. The measure of the model's overall prediction is called pseudo R 2 . This should be interpreted as analogous to the adjusted R 2 value reported in OLS multiple regression.
7. We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for offering this insight. 8. We are thankful to one of our anonymous reviewers for suggesting this as a possible explanation.
9. The only statistically significant CARs for general IT investment announcements were negative in the case of IT investment announcements in the U.S. retail sector (p < 0.01) [30] and for Japanese firms (p < 0.05) [64] .
